We thank Ronit Levine-Schnur for the interest she took in our paper and for taking the time to suggest improvements to the methods (1). Finding ways to accurately measure enforcement is an important challenge for sustainability research, and especially so for research conducted in data-poor environments such as the Gran Chaco and Chiquitano region, where government institutions themselves sometimes lack proper data on illegal deforestation and fines. Börner et al. (2) applied previous economic theorizations about optimal law enforcement to the context of illegal deforestation. The actual deterrence to deforestation depends on the legal disincentive and on the effectiveness of its delivery mechanism-i.e., the enforcement probability (2). Official per-hectare fines for illegal deforestation is information that is publicly accessible and generally known by actors making land-use decisions. By contrast, the probability of illegal deforestation being detected and effectively sanctioned is more difficult to estimate, as it may vary through time and by enforcement agency.
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There are several reasons why factors associated with destinations by respondents might differ from factors revealed by our statistical model (3). As rightly pointed out by Levine-Schnur, this could be due to the actors voluntarily downplaying the role of enforcement, or to a limited awareness of differences in enforcement levels. A third possible explanation is the existence of a gap between characteristics consciously attributed to places and those actually determining choices. Although the data do not allow us to draw conclusions on the weight of these different effects, we acknowledge that the question of the relationship between stated and revealed preferences in the context of agricultural investment would be worthy of further investigation.
Because information on historical fines was not available for the whole region and study period, we chose to quantify enforcement as the product of separate indices of risk and monitoring (3). Based on our key informant interviews, we are confident that, given the data limitations, our metrics provide a useful characterization of differences across provinces. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this metric of enforcement may fail to account for the failure of authorities to pursue legal sanctions against identified illegal deforestation, due to either indifference or outright corruption.
As a result, we agree that it would be desirable to identify the correlation between illegal deforestation and actual fines. We hope that, in the future, increased transparency about illegality and fines will make it possible for researchers to conduct such analyses and create more accurate and precise estimates of enforcement.
